private or embarrassing to members of his commimity or even to his own farrüly. Although he never equaled the fame or irifluence as a country newspaper editor achieved by William Allen White of the Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, Aull eventuaUy eamed the respect of influential papers such as the New York Times and of famous politicians such as President Harry S Truman. Aull was, according to Truman, an "able and picturesque figure in American journalism."
Chad Stebbir\s has written a readable and sometimes engaging biography of this feisty but largely forgotten country editor. Stebbins provides a basic chronology of Aull's life, with several extended discussions of the major events and stories that shaped the editor's career. Stebbir\s thankfully removed most of the telltale signs of the academic dissertation on which this published version is based, but perhaps too much so. Missing from this story is the richness and texture of a wellcrafted history that shows not just the personality and character of the man, but the meaning and significance of his work and his legacy. In that sense, the book is more of a news story than a history, more of an obituary than a biography. The book would have benefited from a fuller and deeper analysis and evaluation of Aull's journalistic practices and his enduring contributions, if any, to his craft and his commurüty-something that looked below the big E on the eye chart. But Stebbiris provides so Htfle analytical perspective on his subject that it is difficvdt to find a sharp focal point to his narrative.
Stebbins clearly did a great deal of primary research, but the wider context and significance of Aull's life and work remain largely imexamined. The result is ultimately disappointing. Without the additional perspectives of critical historical context and significance, another biography of a relatively obscure country editor-publisher may be, as Thoreau once said of going aroimd the world to count the cats in Zanzibar, not worth the effort. All the News is not a bad book; it's just not all it might have been. 
REVIEWED BY JOHN O. ANHNSON, ST. PAUL DISTRICT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS
Unruly River is timely and important as states along the Missouri River wage a batfle over the river's management. Should the Corps of Engineers continue to control the river for shipping agricultural products. which benefits the downstream states of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and Kar\sas? Or should the Corps begin regulating the river for South and North Dakota and Montana, where large dams provide water for hydroelectricity, irrigation, fiood control, recreation, and navigation? By examining how and why humans have changed the Missouri River, Robert Kelley Schneiders presents the historical context for this debate, the outcome of which will affect Iowa.
Schneiders begins by reviewing the historiography of the Missouri River, from early explorers to recent academic books. He contends that while some works examine the political origins of Missouri River development and some detail the environmental changes, no work puts them together. Schneiders then reviews the historiography of water resource development in the Urüted States. He identifies two basic schools. The first, often associated with Donald Worster's Rivers of Empire (1985) , holds that large, elite groups, such as agribusinesses, and large federal bvireaucracies, such as the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, have pushed through Ü\e major navigation, flood control, and water supply projects. The other camp, illustrated by John Opie's Ogallala (1993), Norris Hundley's The Great Thirst (1992), and James Sherow's Water the Valley (1991), coxmters Worster. They argue that democratic efforts underlay water resource development in the West. Farmers, business interests, and grassroots commurüty orgarüzations fought for and won the major projects. Rather than seeing the projects as bad, these historians stress the benefits of development. Thanks to these projects, the Great Plains and Califorrüa produce food for the nation and the world.
Schneiders provides this context to set his book apart. Most works, he says, look at a brief period. He covers two centuries. Other historiar«, Schneiders adds, have overlooked the role played by the river itself in spurring navigation and flood control projects. He contends that no one else offers a detailed narrative of the environmental changes caused by navigation and flood control improvements. Finally, distancing himself from both Opie and Worster, he concludes that community organizations and elites worked together to develop the river.
Schneiders follows this methodological introduction with a narrative tour down the modem Missouri from its headwaters to its mouth. Then, in seven subsequent chapters, he details the political efforts mounted to ti'ansfonn the river and the Corps of Engineers' role in that trahsforrriation. He focuses on the river between Kansas City and Sioux City, although he deals with the river above and below.
The Corps began working on the lower Missouri River in 1832, but for more than a century, sporadic funding, piecemeal projects, and the river thwarted meaningful navigafion improvements. Tlien, in 1945, Congress adopted the Pick-Sloan Plan, which provided for navigafion, flood control, hydroelectric power, and irrigafion. Navigafion remained paramount, however. Under Pick-Sloan, tihe Corps constructed dams at Fort Randall (1952) , Garrison (1953 ), Gavin's Point (1955 , Oahe (1958), and Big Bend (1963) . By 1970, the Corps had constricted or narrowed the river for navigation from Sioux City to its mouth.
Throughout this history, business and private interests in Kansas City, Sioux City, and other cifies along the Missouri promoted the projects. Their efforts, Schneiders argues, were broad-based and democrafic. To him, they clearly demonstrate that no one economic elite emerged to dominate the Missouri River. And the Corps' frequent inability to dictate where they could use their money and what projects got authorized and funded proves to Schneiders that the Corps did not dominate either. In fact, Schneiders shows that the Corps sometimes opposed major projects for the Missouri River.
Several times, when support for navigafion projects appeared dead, major floods or droughts forced Congress to reconsider. In those cases, Schneiders suggests, "the river itself had a direct effect on the conceptuaüzafion and implementafion of development plans" (85). Schneiders counts this as one of his insights. However, the argviment seems misdirected. Only when humans began occupying the river's floodplain did floods and droughts become a problem. Humans responding to what the river had always done was the inipetus, not the river itself.
Schneiders concludes his book by detailing the environmental impact of the channel control works, which, he insists, have destroyed the Missouri River's natural ecosystem. While downriver interests argue for navigafion and upriver interests insist that recreafion, hydroelectric power, and irrigafion are more important, environmentalists suggest that both are wrong. They assert, and Schneiders agrees, that the greatest benefits would come from removing the stmctures. Here Schneiders expresses his personal feelings more than an academic assessment. Yet he forces us to consider this third altemafive, as so many regions around the coimtry are doing. In the Northwest, on the Mississippi River, and elsewhere, environmentalists are pushing to remove dams. Whichever view one takes, Schneiders's book provides the context from which the discussion about the Missouri must begin, and that is a tremendous contribufion.
